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THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS IN REORGANIZATION
ROBERT W. CRASHER*
This discussion is intended to consider the development of the rights of
creditors in reorganizations. Such development is to be shown by the
cases which foreshadowed the Boyd case ;' the Boyd case itself; the cases
following that decision; the limitations upon the doctrine; and the present
status of the law. The development which may be expected in the future
will also be considered.
In practically all reorganizations, one of the major problems facing
counsel has been that of the Boyd case,2 and it has been in connection with
the decision of the Supreme Court in that case, that an important develop-
ment in the law affecting the reorganization of corporations has occurred.
The Boyd case 3 was foreshadowed by the Monon case in 1899.4 In
that case, a creditor had intervened in the foreclosure proceedings prior to
decree, and the Supreme Court held that a sale should not be confirmed
to bondholders who had purchased pursuant to an arrangement with the
stockholders that the property should be purchased by the bondholders,
cutting off unsecured creditors, but giving the stockholders an interest in
the purchase. After indicating that the amounts involved in the fore-
closure of railroad mortgages are usually so large that only the bondholders
can be considered as probable purchasers, Mr. Justice Brewer said:
": 4 * no such proceedings can be rightfully carried to consumma-
tion which recognize and preserve any interest in the stockholders without
also recognizing and preserving the interests, not merely of the mortgagee,
but of every creditor of the corporation. In other words, if the bondholder
wishes to foreclose and exclude inferior lienholders or general unsecured
creditors and stockholders he may do so, but a foreclosure which attempts
to preserve any interest or right of the mortgagor in the property after
the sale must necessarily secure and preserve the prior rights of general
creditors thereof. This is based upon the familiar rule that the stockholders'
interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of creditors; first of
secured and then of unsecured creditors. And any arrangement of the
parties by which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are
attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class of
creditors comes within judicial denunciation." 5
* Of the Indiana bar.
1 Northern Pacific Rwy. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
2 Northern Pacific Rwy. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
3 Northern Pacific Rwy. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
4 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Rwy. Co., 174
U. S. 674 (1899).
5 See 174 U. S. 674, 683-4 (1899).
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The Trust Fund doctrine is the presumed basis for the Boyd case,6
and was announced by Justice Story in the case of Wood v. Dummer 7 in
1824. Since that time it has been followed by so many cases that only a
few will be cited.8 These cited cases and practically all the others decided
under the Trust Fund doctrine reach the correct result since they protect
the creditor where the stockholder has been given a preference. However,
the reasoning is fallacious. If the assets of a corporation were held as a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors, the corporation could not do any act
without the assent of the creditors. A trustee is responsible to the cestui
for any acts inconsistent with the trust. Thus, even though the corporation
be a solvent one, if the corporation did any act without the consent of the
creditors which involved the assets of the corporation, it would be violating
the duties'of the trust; and, in effect, diverting the trust assets. So, it can
easily be seen that the assets of a corporation cannot be correctly referred
to as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.
The facts of the Boyd case 9 were these: the representatives of the bond-
holders of the old company bought in the road for some $61,000,000 which
was paid almost wholly in bonds and which was less than the amount of the
mortgage debts of $157,000,000. They planned to raise $11,000,000 in cash
for the new company by allowing the stockholders in the old company a
chance to buy the new stock by assessment of $10 or $15 on their old
shares. Before the mortgage was foreclosed a suit had been brought by
Paton, an unsecured creditor, alleging that the foreclosure was a conspiracy
between the bondholders and the stockholders. The Circuit Court held
against these creditors on the ground that, the assets being insufficient to
pay the mortgage debt, there was no equity from which the unsecured
creditors could be paid and no reason why the bondholders should not make
any arrangement they chose with the old stockholders. No appeal was
taken in that case. But this was not binding on Boyd. The road was sold
for $61,000,000 and the new company immediately issued $190,000,000 in
bonds and $155,000,000 in stock on property which had been bought a
month before for $61,000,000 and agreed to be worth $345,000,000.
Boyd was a creditor of the old company. No provision was made for
unsecured creditors, such as Boyd, on the assumption that any equity in the
assets which they could have reached would be cut off by the foreclosure
sale. Boyd brought a creditor's bill against the new company ten years
after the foreclosure sale, seeking to subject the assets acquired by the new
company to the payment of his judgment against the old company. He
attacked the reorganization plan because it made no provision for the pay-
ment of unsecured creditors, although the stockholders retained an interest
by receiving new shares partly in consideration of the old shares.
The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, held that the foreclosure sale
was not necessarily final in cutting off unsecured creditors where the stock-
holders share in the reorganized enterprise in consideration of the old stock.
6228 U. S. 482 (1913).
7 3 Mason 308.
s Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371 (1893); Scammon v.
Kimball, 92 U. S. 362 (1875); Chicago Ry. v. Howard, 7 Wallace 392 (1868);
Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 Fed. 159 (C. C. A. 8th 1918); Central
of Ga. Ry. v. Paul, 93 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 5th 1899); McVicker v. American Opera
Co., 40 Fed. 861 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1889); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Rector. 124
Ark. 90, 186 S. W. 622 (1916); Blanc v. Paymaster Mining Co., 95 Calif. 524, 30
Pac. 765 (1892); Barber v. Morgan, 89 Conn. 583, 94 Atl. 984 (1915); Donnally v.
Hearndon, 41 W. Va. 519, 23 S. E. 646 (1895); Goddard v. Fishel-Schlicten Im-
porting Co., 9 Colo. A. 306, 48 Pac. 279 (1897).
9 Northern Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482.
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A transfer which preserves to a stockholder an interest in the new corpora-
tion in consideration of his interest in the old is fraudulent as against
creditors unless the reorganization plan gives them a fair offer of securities
in the reorganized company superior to the offer made to the old stock-
holders.
However, the Supreme Court did recognize the frequent necessity for
allowing stockholders to retain their interest in a reorganized company, and
the validity of such plans if they include the preservation to all the creditors
of interests in the reorganized concern which, all the circumstances consid-
ered, are fair and equitable. Mr. Justice Lamar, delivering the majority
opinion, said:
"::. * =" it is now settled that such reorganizations are not necessarily
illegal, and, as proceedings to subject the property must usually be in a
court where those who ask equity must do equity, such reorganizations may
even have an effect more extensive than those made without judicial sale,
and bind creditors who do not accept fair terms offered. The enormous
value of corporate property often makes it impossible for one, or a score, or
a hundred bondholders to purchase, and equally so for stockholders to
protect their interests. A combination is necessary to secure a bidder and to
prevent a sacrifice. Cooperation being essential, there is no reason why the
stockholders should not unite with the bondholders to buy in the property.
"That was done in the present case. And while the agreement con-
tained no provision as to the payment of unsecured creditors, yet the Rail-
way Company purchased unsecured claims aggregating $14,000,000. Whether
they were acquired because of their value, to avoid litigation, or in recogni-
tion of the fact that such claims were superior to the rights of stockholders,
does not appear, nor is it material. For if purposely or unintentionally a
single creditor was not paid, or provided for in the reorganization, he could
assert his superior rights against the subordinate interests of the old stock-
holders in the property transferred to the new company. They were in the
position of insolvent debtors who could not reserve an interest as against
creditors. Their original contribution to the capital stock was subject to'
the payment of debts. The property was a trust fund charged primarily
with the payment of corporate liabilities. Any device, whether by private
contract or judicial sale under consent decree, whereby stockholders were
preferred before the creditor was invalid. Being bound for the debts, the
purchase of their property, by the new company, for their benefit, put the'
stockholders in the position of a mortgagor buying at his own sale
*~ ~ *"I0
Then to show that the invalidity in the case arose only out of the fact
that Boyd was excluded from any interest in the property, the court said:
"This conclusion does not, as claimed, require the impossible and make it
necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stockholders
retaining an interest in the reorganized company. His interest can be pre-
served by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred
stock. If he declines a fair offer he is left to protect himself as any other,
creditor of a judgment debtor, and having refused to 'come into a just
reorganization, could not be heard in a court of equity to attack it. If,
however, no such tender was made and kept good he retains the right to
subject the interest of the old stockholders in the property to the paymenf
10 See 228 U. S. 482, 503-4.
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of his debt, If their interest is valueless, he gets nothing. If it be valuable,
he merely subjects that which the law had originally and continuously made
liable for the payment of corporate liabilities.""
The Boyd case has been followed in both Federal and state courts.12  In
Mountain States Power Co. v. Jordan Lumber Co.1 3 the measure of recov-
ery by the unsecured creditor was limited to the value of the property in
excess of the secured indebtedness. But when considered in the light of the
language used in the Boyd case where it is said:
"The invalidity of the sale flowed from the character of the reorganiza-
tion agreement regardless of the value of the property, for in cases like
this, the question must be decided according to a fixed principle, not leaving
the rights of the creditors to depend upon the balancing of evidence as to
whether, on the day of sale the property was insufficient to pay prior en-
cumbrances * * , 14
it seems that this is an unwarranted limitation of the case.
Where former stockholders of the old corporation purchase stock in the
new corporation, paying full value for the stock, the principle of the Boyd
case does not apply.15 In such a case, the stockholder receives nothing by
virtue of his stock in the old corporation.
As the Boyd case involved the claim of an unsecured creditor in a large
railroad reorganization, the doctrine was erroneously limited to unsecured
creditors and to a railroad reorganization for a time. But it is not so limited
and it has been frequently applied to cases involving industrial corpo-
rations. 16
The Boyd case requires that fair or equitable terms in the reorganization
plan must be offered to the unsecured creditor. 17
In March, 1916, the first large railroad reorganization following the Boyd
case (that of St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co.) came on for final
decree before Judge Sanborn.' s There was inserted in the foreclosure
decree1 9 a provision that no sale should be confirmed to any corporation
organized pursuant to a reorganization plan admitting stockholders of the
old company to any interest, unless a fair and timely offer of cash, or a fair
and timely offer of participation through stocks, bonds or otherwise, had
been made to all creditors who had filed their claims and whose claims were
subordinate to the junior mortgages.
1 See 228 U. S. 482, 508.
12 Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 166 (1916);
approving Central Improvement Co. v. Cambria Steel Co., 210 Fed. 696 (1913);
Howard v. Maxwell Motor Co., 269 Fed. 292 (1920) aff'd. in 275 Fed. 53; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. "J. S. etc. Trust Co., 221 Fed. 545 (1915); Wabash Ry.
Co. v. Marshall, (Mich.) 195 N. W. 134 (1923); Pittsmont Copper Co. v. O'Rourke,
49 Mount. 281, 141 Pac. 849 (1914); Sweeney v. O'Brien Mining Co., 194 Mo. A. 140,
186 S. W. 739 (1916).
'3 293 Fed. 502, 507 (1923).
14 See 228 U. S. 482, 507.
15 Oehring v. Fox Typewriter Co. (1921), 272 Fed. 833; Sebree v. Cassville
& W. R. Co. (Mo. 1919), 212 S. W. 11, 16.
16 Howard v. Maxwell Motor Co., 269 Fed. 292 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); Okmulgee
Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 Fed. 159, 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); Safety Car
Heating Co. v. U. S. Light & Heat Co., 2 Fed. (2d) 384, 386 (W. D. N. Y. 1924).
17 See 228 U. S. 482, 508.
18 No. Am. Co. v. St. Louis. & San Francisco Ry., U. S. D. C., E. D., Mo.,
Cons. Cause Eq. No. 4174, final decree entered 1916 (not reported).
19 St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123, 126, E. D. Mo.
1918, a case arising out of the same reorganization.
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The problem of the court in such cases is not whether the plan proposed
is the best plan which could be drawn, or is the plan which the court would
draw if left to its own devices, but whether there is anything in the plan
so inequitable to any class of security holders that the court should withhold
confirmation of the sale.20
Mathematical exactness is not required and is not possible. Every re-
organization plan is a compromise from necessity. The court therefore is
in a position to do no more than see that the respective priorities of the
security holders are substantially maintained or that such adjustments thereof
as may be made are not inequitable. It does not attempt to pass on ques-
tions of business judgment as to which the opinions of different groups of
security holders may properly differ.
A common basis of attack upon reorganization plans is the claim that
stockholders are being too liberally treated. The objectors concede that
stockholders may be admitted to some interest in the new company, they
urge that the fair value of this participation must not be in excess of the
amount of the stockholders' assessment. When it appears, as it did in the
Mlissouri Pacific case,2 1 that junior bondholders and unsecured creditors
are to receive preferred stock which is selling at 53, while common stock-
holders upon payment of $17 per share, are to get stock selling at 30, it is
argued that the difference here $13 per share of common stock represents a
"substantial equity" in the property which has been unlawfully diverted
from the creditors for the benefit of the stockholders. The Boyd case is
cited to prove the consequent illegality of the reorganization. If this argu-
ment could be maintained, successful corporate reorganizations would be
impossible because stockholders constitute the best, and often the only,
available source of new money, and their 15articipation is essential. Such
participation can be obtained only by a plan which gives the stockholders
something of definite value, over and above what they pay for. The answer
to the argument that this constitutes an appropriation to the stockholders
of a substantial equity in the property is that this equity is largely attributable
to the fact that the stockholders are willing to put more money into the
property; and if they were not willing to do this,-if the plan were not
made reasonably attractive to them,-the "substantial equity" would dis-
appear.2 2 However, it must be kept in mind that the unsecured creditor
has to be treated fairly.
Some writers have found support in the Boyd case for the theory that
a court of equity may, without judicial sale, impose upon all security holders
and creditors a reorganization plan found by the court to be equitable and
enjoin them forever from attacking it.23 Square support for the doctrine
is found in two cases arising out of the Rock Island receivership. 24 Judge
Carpenter found that the plan for reorganization for the Rock Island road
was fair to the creditors and stockholders, and turned the property back to
the company without a sale, enjoining all creditors from pursuing their
20 Guaranty Trust Co. v. International Steam Pump Co., 231 Fed. 594 (C.
C. A. 2nd, 1916); Conley v. International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286 (S. D. N. Y.
1915).
21 Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 238 Fed. 812
(U. S. D. C., E. D. Mo. 1916).
22 No. Am. Co. v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., U. S. D. C., E. D. Mo.,
E. Div. Cons. Cause Eq. No. 4174, Aug. 29, 1916 (not reported).
23 See Rosenberg, Reorganization-The Next Step (1922), 22 Col. L. R. 14.
24 Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Lincoln Horse & M. Com'n. Co., 284 Fed. 955(C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
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claims against the company.2 5 There had been deposited under the plan
more than 95% of the debt and 99o of the stock. No appeal was taken
from the decree, but non-assenting creditors attempted to attach property of
the new company in other jurisdictions. The company sought to enjoin
them, on the ground that such attachments were in violation of Judge
Carpenter's decree in the receivership proceedings. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sustained such injunctions. Judge Sanborn,
in his opinion, said that the reorganization constituted a method of admin-
istering the trust estate which was within the power of the court; and that
the terms of the reorganization were binding upon creditors, both those who
had filed their claims but refused to accept the terms of the plan, and those
whose claims had not been filed.26
The decision is justified on the theory that the Supreme Court in the
Boyd case had demonstrated the futility of judicial sales where the reor-
ganization was unfair to the creditor. The vice of the reorganization in the
Boyd case was the inequitable exclusion of the creditor and not the lack
of judicial sale. The holding that the creditor so treated was not cut off
by the sale, was considered persuasive authority for dispensing with the
sale where the reorganization was fair. It is submitted that there is no
legal foundation for such a proposition. The vice in the Boyd case could
not be the lack of a judicial sale because there the property had been offered
for sale in the recognized fashion. It seems clear that the voidability of
the sale as to such a creditor does not demonstrate the futility of judicial
sales in general.
The question presents itself again in the Coriell v. Morris White Inc. 27
where the court ordered an appraisal by a master to ascertain what the
proceeds of a sale would have been as a substitute for the conventional sale
itself. The creditors were not forced to take stock in the reorganized com-
pany but were given a chance to accept a cash alternative based on an
appraisal. This is without doubt a desirable development because a public
sale entails a considerable waste of the assets of the debtor corporation.
Such sales also give a dissenting creditor an excellent opportunity to unduly
delay the reorganization. But, it is doubtful whether the court has jurisdic--
tion to put such a plan into effect. That such change might be proper by
statute has been pointed out by the Supreme Court,2 8 and such a method of-
conferring jurisdiction upon the court would be the surest way to obtain the
desired result.
The dissenting creditors-in the Morris White reorganization brought a
writ of certiorari to review the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 29-
The petitioners contend that the court had no power to deprive the dissenting
creditors of a cash share in the assets; and that the amount of this share
should have been determined by public sale. The Supreme Court reversed
the decree approving the plan because the procedure was improper. Mr.
Justice Brandeis said:
"The non-assenting creditors were entitled to have the plan and their
objections considered in an orderly way, and to a decree based on adequate
25 Am. Steel Foundries v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., U. S. D. C. N. D. Ill., E..
Div. Cons. Cause Eq. No. 445 1917 (not reported).
6 Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Lincoln Horse & M. Com'n. Co., 284 Fed. 955 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922).
27 54 Fed. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931), reversed 53 Sp. Ct. Rep. 678.
'28 Canada Southern Ry. v.- Gebhardi-109 -U. S. 527 -(1883) (to be discussed,
later.)
29 Nat. Surety Co. v. Coriell, 53 Sp. Ct. Rep. 678 (1933).
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data. The District Court had before it, in support of the plan. only informal,
inadequate, and conflicting ex parte assertions unsupported by testimony.
It undertook to pass upon the wisdom and fairness of the plan of reorgan-
ization and the rights of non-assenting creditors. For the proper disposi-
tion of these questions, definite, detailed, and authentic information was
essential. Such information was wholly lacking."
The court failed to discuss the question whether the dissenting creditors
were entitled to a cash share in the assets. Thus, it is seen that at the last
opportunity which the Supreme Court had to decide the question, it refused
to do so, and in this evasion lies the importance of the case. It indicates that
the court will evade the question until it is squarely confronted with it.
Also, when a court is so reluctant to decide a question there is the possi-
bility that it is going to change its position. There is no doubt that it would
be highly desirable to extinguish the claims of dissenting creditors against
the property of the insolvent with something other than cash if they fail
to accept the terms of a fair reorganization plan.
The Kansas City Railway case 30 approaches this view. It held that a
plan was fair and binding on unsecured creditors which offered them securi-
ties of the same grade, but in a larger amount, than offered to the stock-
holders.
The court said:
"- --- * unsecured creditors may be protected through other arrange-
ments which distinctly recognize their equitable right to be preferred to
stockholders against the full value of all property belonging to the debtor
corporation, and afford each of them fair opportunity measured by the exist-
ing circumstances, to avail himself of this right.
"If creditors decline a fair offer based upon the principles above stated,
they are left to protect themselves, and cannot attack the reorganization in a
court of equity."
This decision does force the creditors to take securities to which they
objected, but it is not shown that the creditors made a demand for cash
payment. They were insisting that their claim be preferred in its entirety
to the stockholders.
It is to be regretted that the question of alternative cash payment was
not presented by the creditors. If such had been done, we would have had
a decision on the point. In fact, the case came up on reserved questions, and
the court only answered these questions. Therefore, the case is not an
authority for the proposition that unsecured creditors can be made to accept
something other than cash.
One writer 3i argues that such can be done and cites as authority the
following dictum in the Boyd case :32
"This conclusion does not, as claimed, require the impossible and make
it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stock-
holders retaining an interest in the reorganized company. His interest can
be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or pre-
ferred stock. If he declines a fair offer he is left to protect himself as any
30 Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S.
445 (1926).
31 Rosenberg. Reorganization-The Next Step (1922), 22 Col. L. R. 14.
32 228 U. S. 482, 506 (1913).
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other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having refused to come into a
just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in a court of equity to
attack it."
It is the only declaration by the Supreme Court upon the point, and
although it is sheer dictum, it has some weight. For one reason, the state-
ment was made to answer an argument of the counsel for the railway, which
seems to have bothered the court a great deal, that recognition of Boyd's
claim would mean the adoption of a principle requiring payment of cash to
creditors and that such a principle would prevent the possibility of
reorganization.
As to the result to be reached if this dictum is followed, the writer says:
"If the words of the dictum are to be given effect, full provision can be
made for unsecured creditors by offering them income bonds or preferred
stock on a basis found fair by the court. If the creditors do not choose to
accept these securities, they are relegated to the position of a judgment
creditor of the defendant company without resort to the new company
which, as a part of the reorganization, takes over the property. If the new
company tenders securities deemed fair by the court, and* keeps good its
tender, it receives a good and secure title to the property. The creditor
who does not like his preferred stock or his income bond has the empty relief
of a worthless judgment against the old company." 33
In considering the rights of the secured creditor, which question was not
before the court in the Boyd case, the writer continues :34
"The question of due process immediately presents itself. But such
question also arises in connection with the claims of unsecured creditors.
An unsecured creditor who holds a promissory note owns property, and has
the vested constitutional right to bring suit, to get judgment and to issue
execution against the debtor's entire assets. Yet this property right has
been brushed aside in an equitable receivership suit.3 5 To enjoin him from
action, from putting his claim into judgment, and from issuing execution
are matters of common daily practice. If such a property right may be so
treated, why should not secured creditors be subordinated to the new money
w,¢hich makes a reorganization possible and which in fact preserves the very
rights of the secured creditor?"
The Gebhard case 36 is frequently cited as an authority for the proposi-
tion that legislation enacting the desired result would be constitutional. But
the decision of the case is not on that point. The plaintiffs were United
States citizens who owned bonds in a Canadian corporation. Parliament
passed an act which bound the minority bondholders to the reorganization
plan. The Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution did not apply to such a situation because they were conclusively
presumed to have contracted with the view that such laws might be passed,
and had waived any protection under the due process clause.
However, in its opinion, the court does say :37
33 Rosenberg, 22 Col. L. R. 16, 17.
34 Rosenberg, 22 Col. L. R. 16.
35 Re. Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (1908).
36 109 U. S. 527.
37 109 U. S. 527, 535, 36.
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"Hence it seems to be eminently proper that where the legislative power
exists some statutory provision should be made for binding the minority in
a reasonable way by the will of the majority; and unless as is the case in
the States of the United States, the passage of laws impairing the obligation
of contracts is forbidden, we see no good reason why such provision may
not be made in respect to existing as well as prospective obligations. The
nature of the securities of this class is such that the right of legislative
supervision for the good of all, unless restrained by some constitutional
prohibition seems almost necessarily to form one of their ingredients, and
when insolvency is threatened, and the interests of the public, as well as
creditors, are imperiled by the financial embarrassments of the corporation,
a reasonable scheme of arrangement may, in our opinion, as well be legalized
as an ordinary composition in bankruptcy."
This is mere dictum because United States legislation was not before the
court, but it does indicate that the court thought such legislation would be
constitutional.
"It is clear that such legislation would not be invalid as a law impairing
the obligation of contracts since that constitutional inhibition is directed
against the states only, not against the Federal government in any of its
functions, judicial, legislative, or executive.38  Thus, a bankruptcy statute
though impairing contract rights is none the less constitutional,3 9 and com-
positions in bankruptcy, though requiring dissenting minorities to accept in
discharge of their claims money, or even notes, for less than par can legally
be accomplished. 40 The due process clause of fifth amendment contains
the crux of the question, since this limitation voids confiscatory acts by any
branch of the Federal government." 41
Of course, the writer does not mean that a majority of the bondholders
can not insist upon a foreclosure if they wish to do so. His intention was
to state that if a substantial majority are in favor of a plan, a minority
should be bound by such majority's judgment.
No writer has been found who denies that such legislation would be con-
stitutional because a denial of due process of law. If such legislation is
due process of law, it would seem that the same acts, if done by a court,
would be due process also. Due process of law merely requires a reasonable
regulation, and it cannot be doubted after considering the interest of the
public in corporate reorganizations that such regulation would be reasonable.
The acts of the Federal courts are no more curtailed by "the impairment
of contract obligation" than is the Federal Congress. 42
It is not doubted that the proper method whereby unsecured creditors
could be provided for with something other than cash would be by an Act
of Congress. However, in the absence of such an act, it is hoped that the
courts will exercise this power. It can be argued that the courts are not
prepared to handle those financial problems inherent in corporate reorgan-
izations. But, the problems of the courts are generally reduced to passing
upon differences between the classes of security holders as to what is fair
to them respectively. These are problems of equities, rather than finance--
38 Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401 (1883).
39 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 122 (1819).
40 In re Kinnane Co. (D. C. 1914), 33 Am. Br. 234; In re McNab and H. Mfg.
Co. (D. C. 1878), 16 Fed. Cas. No. 8906.
41 Rosenberg, 22 Col. L. R. 14, 17.
42 Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401 (1883).
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problems which experienced and disinterested judges are better qualified to
solve than anyone else. This does not mean that the courts should have the
power to devise a plan of its own, but only the power to pass upon the
fairness of the plan, and, if reasonable, to accept it. The courts might be
given a slight power of amendment, but it can be argued that if a plan were
amended under such power it should be submitted and passed upon by
the majority.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
JOSEPH HEFFERNAN*
. . the supreme power cannot take away from any
man any part of his property without his consent."-John
Locke (1690).'
"Upon such confirmation . . . the plan and . . .
the order . . . shall be binding upon . . . all stock-
holders . . . including those who have not, as well as
those who have, accepted it, and . . . upon all creditors,
secured or unsecured . . . including those who have not,
as well as those who have accepted it." U. S. Bankruptcy Act,
Sec. 77B(g) (1934).2
This paper will discuss the justifiability of this subsection of the cor-
porate reorganization provisions of the bankruptcy act. Under the Ameri-
can scheme of government this means a consideration of the constitutionality
of the legislation. It might be regarded as significant that a lawyer should
begin a discussion of the subject by quoting "what a dead hand wrote"
nearly two hundred and fifty years ago. The answer is that the hand
is not yet dead. When the corporate reorganization provisions of the bank-
ruptcy act (Sec. 77B) were proposed in Congress and the hearings held in
committee upon the bill, names prominent in the legal profession came
forward to protest its unconstitutionality. 3 Their objections were two. It
* Of the Washington (Ind.) Bar. Research fellow, Columbia Law School.
1 "An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Govern-
ment," (1690), (Everyman Ed., p. 187). As a statement of Locke's precise position,
it is conceded that this quotation is out of context and misleading. In fact it is
fairly inferable from this same essay that Locke held that the consent in question
could be given by a majority, either in person or through their duly chosen
representatives. In any event, Locke was really undertaking nothing more
ambitious in this essay than the refutation of the doctrine of absolute monarchy,
and to justify the English Revolution of 1688. But his words have been taken
over by the generations which followed him and used to justify absolute concepts
of property rights. The course of this flow of ideas has been traced. Hamilton:
Property According to Locke, 41 Yale L. J. 864 (1932).
248 Stat. 911, 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 207(g). Approved June 7, 1934.
3 Among these are: Morford: Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganiza-
tion: A Negative View, 19 A. B. A. J. 702 (December, 1933). Stebbins: Constitu-
tionality of Recent Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Marquette L. R. 173
(April, 1933). Special Committee on Bankruptcy, Bar Assn. of St. Louis Joint
Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 72nd
Congress, 1st Session on S. 3866, at page 525. Josiah Marvel, Jr., ibid., at page
568. Harold Remington (author of Remington on Bankruptcy), ibid. at page 795.
Edwin C. Brandenburg (author of Brandenburg on Bankruptcy), ibid. at page
945. Kenneth Dayton, Counsel to the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York, ibid. at page 202.
